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Abstract
We use a Tullock-type contest to show that intuitively and structurally different contests
can be strategically equivalent. Strategically equivalent contests generate the same best response
functions and, as a result, the same efforts. Two strategically equivalent contests, however, may
yield different equilibrium payoffs. We propose a simple two-step procedure to identify
strategically equivalent contests. Using this procedure, we identify contests that are strategically
equivalent to the original Tullock contest, and provide new examples of strategically equivalent
contests. Finally, we discuss possible contest design applications and avenues for future
theoretical and empirical research.
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1. Introduction
A contest is a game in which players expend costly resources, such as effort, money or
time, in order to win a prize. Since the seminal papers of Tullock (1980) and Lazear and Rosen
(1981), many different contests have been introduced to the literature. For example, Skaperdas
(1992) study contests where the final payoff depends on the residual resources and the prize.
Chung (1996) and Kaplan et al. (2002) examine contests with effort-dependent prizes. Lee and
Kang (1998) and Baye et al. (2005) study contests with rank-order spillovers. Although these
contests are intuitively and structurally very different, they often share common links.
There are several studies that establish common links between different contests. For
example, Che and Gale (2000) provide a link between a rank-order tournament of Lazear and
Rosen (1981) and an all-pay auction of Hillman and Riley (1989). Baye et al. (2012) show the
connection between the all-pay auction and pricing games (Varian, 1980; Rosenthal, 1980).
Hirshleifer and Riley (1992) show how an R&D race between two players which is modeled as a
rank-order tournament is equivalent to a rent-seeking contest.1 Baye and Hoppe (2003) identify
conditions under which research tournament models (Fullerton and McAfee, 1999) and patent
race models (Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1980) are strategically equivalent to the rent-seeking contest.
These duality results permit one to apply results derived in the rent-seeking contest literature to
the innovation, patent race, and rank-order tournament models, and vice versa.
In this paper we show that intuitively and structurally different contests can be
strategically and effort equivalent. We consider a two-player Tullock-type contest, where
outcome-contingent payoffs are linear functions of prizes, own effort, and the effort of the rival.
1

Jia (2008) extends the result by proving a more general equivalence between a rank-order tournament and a rentseeking contest. Fu and Lu (2012) shows that the rent-seeking contest can further include auctions with preinvestment (Tan, 1992). Similarly, Sheremeta et al. (2012) links the rent-seeking contest to a proportional-prize
contest. Chowdhury (2009) demonstrates the connection between all-pay auctions (Siegel, 2009) and capacityconstrained price contests (Osborne and Pitchik, 1986; Deneckere and Kovenock, 1996).
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Under this structure, we identify strategically equivalent contests that generate the same best
response functions and, as a result, the same equilibrium efforts. However, the strategically
equivalent contests may yield different equilibrium payoffs.
It is important to emphasize that the aforementioned studies establish links between
different families of contests, such as all-pay auctions, rent-seeking contests, and rank-order
tournaments. The main result of this paper is conceptually very different from the findings of the
previous studies. In particular, we show that even within the same family of Tullock-type
contests, different types of contests might produce the same best response functions and the same
equilibrium efforts (although not necessarily the same payoffs).
This is an important finding for a number of reasons. First, there exists a substantial
literature modeling the rules of the contest as an endogenous choice of a contest designer
(Dasgupta and Nti, 1998; Epstein and Nitzan, 2006; Corchón and Dahm, 2011; Polishchuk and
Tonis, 2012). A contest designer can choose the parameters of the model to maximize the total
rent dissipation (as in the case of rent-seeking), or maximize the equilibrium highest effort (as in
R&D races), or minimize the total equilibrium effort (as in electoral races), or simply to enhance
public welfare. Our results demonstrate that it is possible for a contest designer to achieve
different goals using strategically equivalent contests. For example, the contest designer seeking
Pareto improvement may choose a contest that generates the same equilibrium efforts, incurs the
same costs, but results in higher expected payoffs for contestants. Finally, certain contests may
not be feasible to implement in the field due to regulatory restrictions, or due to the possibility of
collusion among contestants. However, such restrictions may not apply to other strategically
equivalent contests.
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2. The Model
Following Baye et al. (2005, 2012) and Chowdhury and Sheremeta (2011a, 2011b), we
consider a two-player contest with two prizes. The players, denoted by and , value the winning
and the losing prizes as

0 and

independently expend efforts

0 and

, with

. Players simultaneously and

0. The probability of player winning the contest

is defined by a lottery contest success function (Tullock, 1980):
/
1/2

,

if
if

0
0

(1)

Contingent upon winning or losing, the payoff for player is a linear function of prizes,
own effort, and the effort of the rival:

where

,

,
,

with probability
with probability 1

,
are cost parameters (

0,

0), and

,

(2)

are spillover parameters. We

define the contest described by (1) and (2) as Γ , , Ω , where Ω

, ,

,

,

,

is a set

of parameters. All parameters in Ω and the contest success function are common knowledge. The
players are risk neutral, therefore the expected payoff for player is
,
where

,

(3)
0,0 . For

0, the expected payoff is

Player ’s best response is derived by maximizing

,

,

/2.

with respect to

:
(4)

Chowdhury and Sheremeta (2011a) show that although the payoff function (3) is not
globally concave, the first order condition and the resulting best response function (4) are
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sufficient for an equilibrium to exist. Moreover, under the appropriate restrictions, i.e.,
0 and

3

0, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium defined by:
.

(5)

Given the symmetric equilibrium (5), the equilibrium payoff is
.

(6)

The contest Γ , , Ω , defined by (1) and (2), may also generate asymmetric equilibria.
Since in the current study we focus only on the symmetric equilibrium, we impose further
restriction 5

0 , derived by Chowdhury and Sheremeta (2011b), to

guarantee the uniqueness of the equilibrium.

3. Equivalent Contests
In this section, we define strategically equivalent contests and show the required
parametric restrictions to obtain the equivalence. We start by providing a definition of strategic
equivalence.
Definition 1: Contests are strategically equivalent if they generate the same best response
functions.
This definition of strategic equivalence of contests is different from the one used by Baye
and Hoppe (2003). According to their definition, games are strategically equivalent when they
generate the same expected payoff functions, and thus the same equilibrium payoffs. Here, we
use a less strict definition of strategic equivalence, namely equivalence of the best response
functions. It is usually the case in the contest design literature that a contest designer chooses the
rules of the contest to induce a specific behavior of contestants (Dasgupta and Nti, 1998; Epstein
and Nitzan, 2006; Corchón and Dahm, 2011; Polishchuk and Tonis, 2012). The contest designer

5

is often indifferent towards the resulting payoffs of contestants. Thus, it seems appropriate to
have a less restrictive definition of strategic equivalence that mainly relates to strategic behavior
of contestants and not their payoffs. Nevertheless, one could use a more restrictive definition of
strategic equivalence that also requires the equivalence of payoffs (see the Definition 3 below).
Moreover, a number of contests described in this paper are both strategically and payoff
equivalent.
To demonstrate strategic equivalence, let us consider two contests Γ
Γ

, , Ω , where Ω

,

conditions for contests Γ

, ,Ω

,

,
and Γ

,

,

for

, ,Ω

, ,Ω

and

, . From equation (4), the sufficient

to be strategically equivalent, i.e., to have the

same best response functions, are the following:
and

.

(7)

Next, we define effort equivalent contests.
Definition 2: Contests are effort equivalent if they result in the same equilibrium efforts.
From equation (5), the sufficient condition for contests Γ

, ,Ω

and Γ

, ,Ω

to be

effort equivalent is the following:
.

(8)

Generally, strategic equivalence is a stronger condition than effort equivalence because it
requires different contests to generate exactly the same best response functions, and as a
consequence the same equilibrium efforts. However, given that in our analysis we impose
restrictions to guarantee that only the unique and symmetric equilibrium (5) exists, strategic
equivalence implies effort equivalence and vice versa. It is also important to emphasize that
without spillovers, effort equivalence is the same as the revenue equivalence, since revenue of a
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contest designer is simply the sum of all individual efforts (Baron and Myerson, 1982;
Moldovanu and Sela, 2001).2
In addition to strategic and effort equivalence, we also define payoff equivalent contests.
Definition 3: Contests are payoff equivalent if they generate the same expected payoffs.
From equation (6), the sufficient condition for contests Γ

, ,Ω

and Γ

, ,Ω

to be

payoff equivalent, i.e., to generate the same equilibrium payoffs, is the following:
.

(9)

It is easy to verify that strategic equivalence does not automatically imply payoff
equivalence. As we show in the next section, depending on the cost and spillover parameters in
Ω, one strategically equivalent contest can generate higher payoff than another. Nevertheless,
most contests that we discuss are strategically, effort and payoff equivalent.
Finally, to simplify our analysis we assume that all alternative contests have the same
and

winning prize and the same losing prize, i.e.,

. This

assumption is intuitive given that the contest designer usually has specific pre-defined prizes
which he can use to design a contest. Given this assumption, strategic and effort equivalence
conditions (8) and (9) are simplified to the following condition:
and

.

(10)

In the rest of the paper, we follow a simple two-step procedure to find strategically
equivalent contests to a particular baseline contest. First, we derive the best response function of
the baseline contest as in equation (4). Second, from the best response function of the baseline

2

In contests with spillovers there are different ways to define revenue, and thus effort equivalence may not imply
revenue equivalence. For example, revenue can be defined as the sum of individual efforts and both positive and
negative spillovers, or as the sum of efforts and only positive spillovers. Such alternative definitions of revenue
would require different conditions for revenue equivalence. In this paper, however, we focus only on effort
equivalence since eliciting individual efforts is usually the main objective of a contest designer.
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contest we derive the restrictions needed, as in (10), for a more general family of contests to
generate the same best response functions. This simple procedure is used throughout our
analysis. We begin with the original contest of Tullock (1980) as the baseline contest.

3.1. Original Tullock Contest
In the standard rent-seeking contest, introduced by Tullock (1980), there is no losing
prize and regardless of the outcome of the contest, both players forgo their efforts. In such a case,
0,

the winning prize value

1, and the other parameters in Ω are zero. The

payoff for player in case of winning or losing is
,
,

with probability
with probability 1

,

Using our notation, the Tullock contest is defined as Γ , ,

(11)
, 0, 1, 1,0,0 . The

resulting best response function in such a contest for player is
.

(12)

For a generic contest Γ , ,
Γ , ,

, ,

,

,

,

to be strategically equivalent to contest

, 0, 1, 1,0,0 , according to condition (10), we need to impose the following
1,

restrictions:

1 and

0. Such restrictions guarantee that the best

response function (4) is exactly the same as the best response function (12). Therefore, by
definition these contests are strategically equivalent.
One particularly interesting case arises when we put further restrictions
0. In such a contest, Γ , ,
,

0

1 and

, 0, 1,0, 1,0 , the new payoff function is:
with probability
with probability 1

8

,
,

(13)

Note that in (13), the winner fully reimburses the loser. This can be interpreted as the
‘Marshall system of litigation’ (Baye et al., 2005) in which the winner pays his own legal costs
and also reimburses all of the legal costs of the loser, whereas the standard Tullock contest can
be interpreted as the ‘American system of litigation’ in which each litigant pays its own legal
expenses.3 It can easily be shown that the unique equilibrium for contests defined by (11) and
/4. Moreover, the expected payoff in both

(13) is the symmetric equilibrium with

/4. Therefore, contests (11) and (13) are strategically,

contests is exactly the same,

effort and payoff equivalent. This equivalence is surprising, since the two contests are intuitively
and structurally very different. However, it has been also shown in an all-pay auction setting
under incomplete information (Baye et al., 2005). Therefore, our results provide further evidence
that Marshall and American systems of litigation are revenue (in our case, effort) and payoff
equivalent.
It is also straightforward to show that the ‘input spillover’ contest of Chowdhury and
Sheremeta (2011a) and Baye et al. (2012), where the effort expended by player j partially affects
player and vice versa, is strategically equivalent to the original Tullock contest. The spillover
contest can be defined as Γ , ,

, 0, 1, 1, ,

, where

1,1 is the input spillover

parameter. This type of contest is motivated by spillover effects in R&D innovation
(D’Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988; Kamien et al., 1992). From strategic equivalence condition
(10), one can see that for any value of , the resulting best response function is exactly same as
in (11). Hence, the input spillover contest Γ , ,
to the original Tullock contest Γ , ,

, 0, 1, 1, ,

is strategically equivalent

, 0, 1, 1,0,0 . This result suggests that if an R&D

competition is modeled as a lottery contest, then the existence of symmetric spillovers may not

3

Also see Matros and Armanios (2009) and Yates (2011) for further examples of this type of contests.
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affect the equilibrium. However, the ‘input spillover’ contest is not payoff equivalent to the
original Tullock contest, since condition (9) is not satisfied. It can be easily shown that a positive
(negative) spillover provides a higher (lower) payoff to the players than the Tullock contest.

3.2. Modified Tullock-Type Contests
Researchers often use modified versions of the original Tullock contests in order to
address specific questions such as taxes, subsidies, externalities, effort dependent valuations, cost
differences, etc. There are instances in the literature where two different Tullock-type contests
are strategically equivalent to each other. Here we briefly discuss some of these examples.
Chung (1996) assumes that the value of the winning prize depends on the total effort
expenditures in the contest. A simple linear version of the Chung (1996) model would generate
the following payoff function:
with probability
with probability 1

,
Hence, (14) can be described as Γ , ,

, 0,

,
,

(14)

1, 1, , 0 , where

0,1 , and the best

response function is
/ 1

(15)

Lee and Kang (1998) study a contest with externalities. In their model the cost of effort
decreases with the total effort expenditures. This contest can be captured by
with probability
with probability 1

,
Hence, (16) can be described as Γ , ,

, 0,

1,

1, ,

, where

,
,

(16)
0,1 , and the best

response function is
/ 1

(17)
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When

the best response functions (15) and (17) and the equilibrium effort

expenditures in the two contests are exactly the same. This result indicates that some contests
with endogenous prizes, as in Chung (1996), are strategically equivalent to contests with
externalities, as in Lee and Kang (1998). Also note that, although both contests are strategically
equivalent, they are not payoff equivalent. In particular, the contest defined by (16) results in
higher expected payoff than the contest defined by (14), providing a clear Pareto ranking
between the two contests. Hence, a benevolent contest designer, such as the government trying to
maximize the total social welfare, may opt to choose a contest that elicits the same level of
expenditures and, at the same time, results in Pareto improvement for both contestants.
Next, we consider a ‘limited liability’ contest introduced by Skaperdas and Gan (1995),
where the loser’s payoff is independent of the efforts expended. 4 The authors motivate this
example by stating that contestants may be entrepreneurs who borrow money to spend on
research and development and thus are not legally responsible in case of a loss. The loser of such
a contest is unable to repay the loan and goes bankrupt. In such a case,

0,

1, and the

other parameters in Ω are zero. The payoff is:
,

0

with probability
with probability 1

,
,

(18)

The best response function for player is:
(19)
For a contest to be strategically equivalent to Γ , ,
restrictions from (10) are

4

0,

1 and

, 0, 1,0,0,0

0 . When we impose further

Example of these kinds of contests can also be found in Matros and Armanios (2009).
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the required

1,

restrictions

1 and

0 we obtain a contest with the following payoff

function:
,
,

with probability
with probability 1

,

(20)

This contest can be interpreted as a ‘full liability’ contest, since the loser has to pay in full
the expenditures of both players. Note that although (18) is strategically equivalent to (20), the
‘full liability’ contest is (by definition) more risky than the ‘limited liability’ contest. In (18)
players do not have to worry about what happens in the case of a loss, since they are not legally
responsible. In contrast, the loser in (20) has to pay the expenditures of both players. Therefore,
equivalence between (18) and (20) holds only under the assumption of risk neutrality. Moreover,
it is easy to verify from (9) that contests (18) and (20) are not payoff equivalent. The equilibrium
0 and in the ‘limited liability’ contest it is

payoff in the ‘full liability’ contest is
/3.

Alexeev and Leitzel (1996) study a ‘rent-shrinking’ contest Γ , ,

, 0, 1, 1, 1,0 ,

where the winning prize value decreases by the total effort expenditures. From (10), a
2,

strategically equivalent contest would require
winner’ contest Γ , ,

, 0, 1, 2,0,0

marginal cost of winning (

1 and

0. A ‘lazy

of Chowdhury and Sheremeta (2011a), in which the

1) is lower than the marginal cost of losing (

2),

definitely satisfies these restrictions. Moreover, the two contests are also payoff equivalent. The
equivalence between the ‘rent-shrinking’ and ‘lazy winner’ contests enables the designer to
achieve the same equilibrium rent dissipation using two alternative contests. Nevertheless, the
‘lazy winner’ contest is, arguably, easier to implement and it is less susceptible to the collusion
problem mentioned in Alexeev and Leitzel (1996).
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In many cases a contest designer can use different policy tools to implement a certain
contest. Using the same procedure as before it can be shown that under certain restrictions,
contests with endogenous valuations (Amegashie, 1999), contests with differential cost structure
(Chowdhury and Sheremeta, 2011a), and contests with taxes (Glazer and Konrad, 1999), are
strategically equivalent. Specifically, Glazer and Konrad (1999) study a contest Γ , , 1

,0, 1

, 1,0,0 , in which a part of the rent seeker’s non-negative profit is taxed with tax rate

0,1 . Amegashie (1999) studies a contest Γ , ,

, 0,

1

, 1,0,0 , in which the

winner’s prize value is a linear function of own effort spent. Chowdhury and Sheremeta (2011a)
study the ‘lazy winner’ contest Γ , ,

, 0,

is lower than the marginal cost of losing, i.e., |
,

,

, 0,0 , in which the marginal cost of winning
|

1

, and

|

|. Using condition (7), when 1

1 then the three contests are strategically and

effort equivalent.
The equivalence between these three seemingly unrelated contests conveys an important
message. It shows that the designer can either use policy tools, such as taxes, or contests with
alternative cost structure to achieve the same objective. Moreover, the three contests do not
necessarily generate the same equilibrium payoffs. The equilibrium payoff (under the restriction
of strategic equivalence) in Glazer and Konrad (1999) is
Amegashie (1999) it is
it is

1

W/ 2

1

/ 4

1

W/ 4

3 , in

3 , and in Chowdhury and Sheremeta (2011a)

3 . Hence, a contest designer, such as a government trying to

maximize the social welfare, can achieve a Pareto improvement by choosing a specific contest
structure that generates the highest payoffs for players yet results in the same equilibrium efforts.
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4. Discussion
In this paper we use a Tullock-type contest to show that intuitively and structurally
different contests can be strategically equivalent. We define strategically equivalent contests as
contests that generate the same best response functions. Under the assumption of a unique
equilibrium, strategically equivalent contest are also effort equivalent. However, strategically
equivalent contests may yield different equilibrium payoffs, and thus may not be payoff
equivalent. We describe a simple two-step procedure to identify strategically equivalent contests.
Using this procedure, we identify contests that are strategically equivalent to the original Tullock
contest, and provide new examples of strategically equivalent contests.
We reestablish some existing results derived under alternative contest success functions
and incomplete information, i.e., the equivalence of the American and Marshall systems of
litigation. We also introduce new results, such as the equivalence between a standard Tullock
contest and an input spillover contest, as well as the equivalence of a number of Tullock-type
contests with endogenous valuations, spillovers, and differential cost structures.
Our findings contribute to the contest design literature by demonstrating how different
strategically equivalent contests can be used to achieve the same objectives. A contest designer
may choose to maximize the total rent dissipation, minimize equilibrium efforts, or simply
enhance public welfare. Our results demonstrate that the contest designer can achieve these
objectives by imposing appropriate restrictions on contest parameters. For example, we show
that the two strategically and effort equivalent contests may yield different equilibrium payoffs.
Hence, a contest designer seeking Pareto improvement may choose a contest that generates the
same efforts, incurs the same costs, but results in higher expected payoffs for contestants.
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It is important to understand the critical conditions required for the equivalence to hold in
the field. Following the majority of the rent-seeking contests in the literature, we consider a twoplayer Tullock-type contest with linear cost and spillover structure under risk neutrality. The
strategic equivalence results may not hold if we relax one or more of these assumptions to
incorporate behavioral factors that can influence individual decisions but are not modeled in the
current setting. For example, it has been shown in laboratory settings that contestants make
mistakes (Sheremeta, 2011; Lim et al., 2012), have incorrect judgments (Parco et al., 2005;
Amaldoss and Rapoport, 2009), exhibit non-monetary utility of winning (Sheremeta, 2010; Price
and Sheremeta, 2011) and are usually risk averse (Millner and Pratt, 1991; Sheremeta and
Zhang, 2010; Sheremeta, 2011). 5 Some of these factors may distort individual behavior in
strategically equivalent contests, and thus may break such equivalence. Finally, there are
practical applications in which costs are convex (Moldovanu and Sela, 2001) and spillovers
influence the payoff function in a non-linearly manner (Kräkel, 2004). A different analysis of
equivalence would be required in such cases. Nevertheless, the concept of strategic equivalence
and the two-step procedure to obtain strategically equivalent contests would be still relevant for
such analyses. Using the two-step procedure one could, for example, find equivalence conditions
with more than two players, risk aversion, and non-linear cost/spillover structure. Such analyses
as well as the empirical tests of the equivalence in the laboratory are kept for future research.

5

For an extensive review of the experimental literature on contests see Dechenaux et al. (2012).
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